The 2015 Women's World Cup Final

How a tactical change produced the most dominant final ever and why it matters for the US today

The 2015 World Cup final is understandably known as one of the most brutal World Cup games ever. In a rerun of the 2011 final (and the 2012 Olympic Gold Medal match), the USA faced Japan. Within 16 minutes, they were 4-0 up. Carli Lloyd had already scored a hattrick. The game was as good as done. 

The remaining 74 minutes did bring three more goals with the match eventually finishing 5-2 but it was hard to consider the game as anything more than a total and utter demolition by the US. It was their third World Cup win, and of the four, their most comprehensive result. But in light of a disappointing 2023 performance, it is worth considering whether how they got there was more luck than judgement.

The build up to the 2015 World Cup was dominated by the host nation Canada’s decision to use artificial grass. US players spearheaded a charge objecting to the situation, with Abby Wambach leading a group of 40 players from national teams across the world in attempting to make a legal challenge.¹ Whilst this ultimately failed, the lead up to the tournament was one which once again showed FIFA as failing women’s football. 

This uncertainty about the quality of pitches also extended to the US and their position going into the World Cup. They had not won the competition in 16 years, despite reaching the final in 2011.

They also had a brand new coach. Jill Ellis stepped into the role following the surprise sacking of Scottish coach Tom Sermanni who had been effectively pushed out by the players.² Reportedly players felt that Sermanni was too relaxed, but it is also notable that Sermanni significantly refreshed the squad and liked to rotate his team. That was in sharp contrast to previous coach Pia Sundhage who was much more rigid in her selections, although equally there is some suggestion that she too moved on as a result of the players.³

Ellis had been Sermanni’s assistant, and had previously interviewed for the role. It also seemed that she was going to be kept on a much tighter leash than Sermanni was, being instructed to use a specific group of players for the World Cup.⁴ Ellis had interviewed alongside a fellow assistant coach, a Swedish manager named Tony Gustavsson.

With Ellis in charge, the US stuck to their 4-4-2 and headed to a World Cup in Canada that felt like a home tournament due to the number of US fans able to make the trip across the border. There they found themselves in the Group of Death, alongside Nigeria, Sweden and Australia. 

The group stage was tough work. They required a strong performance from Hope Solo in order to beat Australia in their opener - the 3-1 scoreline flattered the US - and they went on to draw 0-0 with a Sweden side now managed by their former coach Sundhage. A 1-0 win over Nigeria saw them top the group, but there were concerns. 

In the Round of 16, they met Colombia. It was a good reward for finishing top of the Group of Death. Second placed Australia faced Brazil (who they did in fact beat) whilst third placed Sweden had to play Germany. ⁵But they struggled and it was not until goalkeeper Catalina Perez was sent off that they were able to finally score, first through Alex Morgan and then via a Carli Lloyd penalty. Megan Rapinoe and Lauren Holiday also both picked up yellow cards, making them unavailable for the quarter-final, and sparking the tactical switch that would inspire that dominant win in the final.

Holiday had been playing in a midfield two with Lloyd where both had licence to go forward if required. These were two attacking players -  Holiday played the first half of the 2011 final in a front two with Wambach - and it was not always clear who was supposed to be sitting and who was supposed to be going forward. With Holiday unavailable for the quarter-final, Ellis selected Morgan Gautraut (née Brian) to play in a specific holding role behind Lloyd. Wambach was also dropped from the starting line-up, replaced by Amy Rodriguez, and the US won 1-0. Lloyd scored the goal.

Those changes were cemented when Holiday returned to the side in the semi-final. Lloyd partnered with Alex Morgan up front, whilst Holiday played with Gautraut. In reality Lloyd was given the freedom to roam wherever she wanted. It was a decision that would be truly vindicated by the time the US reached the final. 

They were potentially fortunate to get there. Julie Ertz was lucky not to be sent off for her push on Alexandra Popp and Celia Sasic missed the resulting penalty. Then Alex Morgan managed to win the US a penalty with a foul that looked to have taken place outside the area. Lloyd scored that one and Kelley O’Hara added a second as the game wound down.

The final became a rematch of 2011 as the holders Japan once again reached it. They had made it through a relatively easy group with three wins against Switzerland, Cameroon and Ecuador. A 2-1 win over The Netherlands in the Round of 16, a 1-0 win over Australia in the quarters, and a fortunate Laura Bassett own goal in injury time in the semi-finals got them there. There was to be no repeat of the result though, with the US making light work of the Japanese.

Lloyd’s switch of position allowed the US to iterate on their classic direct approach. They were able to play long balls out either to Tobin Heath on the right or Alex Morgan centrally with Lloyd then available in the space behind them. Japan struggled to deal with Heath in particular and their first and second goals came from set pieces that Heath had won - a corner and a free kick. Both times, Lloyd was left unmarked. That allowed her to sweep in from Megan Rapinoe’s flat delivery in a corner routine designed by Gustavsson for her first, before she tapped in Ertz’s flick on from Holiday’s free kick. That was the first five minutes.

Holiday probably thought she had scored the best goal of the final when a poor clearance from Azusa Iwashimizu allowed her to volley in but she was bettered just two minutes later when Lloyd completed her hattrick from the half-way line. The 50 yard lob is one of the most audacious goals you will ever see, and although the fact that the US were already 3-0 up made the stakes a little bit lower, it is an astonishing effort for a World Cup final. 

The win was comprehensive - a World Cup final victory that might never be bettered in terms of its sheer dominance. But it also represents an insight into how quickly tournament football can change. The parallels with the US in 2023 are certainly there. After all, it was yellow card accumulation that saw Rose Lavelle suspended for their Round of 16 match against Sweden, with Vlatko Andonovski rejigging the midfield and seeing an improved performance as a result. 

If the US had edged past Sweden on penalties, is it possible they could have still had a deep run in this tournament? Why not? Tournament football is extremely random. England looked relatively poor themselves, relied on penalties to win their Round of 16 match against Nigeria, and they’re contesting the final.

World Cups are full of sliding door moments like that one, something that was only underlined by the fact that no team underperformed their xG at the World Cup more than the US. In tournament football, a handful of games where you do not take your chances can be killer. Watching the US, it was clear that the way they had been set up was not great, and it is for the best that they parted ways with Andovoski. But 2015 also shows that when everything clicks, a team can look a lot better very quickly.

Something else that is also clear from the lead up to 2015 is that a manager’s impact, even if not ostensibly successful, might only become more apparent later on. Sermannini might only have managed for 24 matches (the fewest of any permanent appointment for the US) but he gave first caps to Morgan Gautraut, Julie Ertz, Crystal Dunn, Christen Press, and Lindsay Horan.⁶ Similarly Andonovski leaves having brought Catarina Macario, Naomi Girma, Sophia Smith and Trinity Rodman all into the US team, to name a few. Just because a coaching appointment turns out not to be a good fit does not mean it cannot have positive benefits.

The US must now try and appoint a new coach ahead of an Olympics next year, but options are limited. The experience with Andonovski has led to calls for a coach with international pedigree, and it is true that the US have had the most success when they have appointed internally, DiCicco and Ellis having both held assistant roles before stepping into the main job. But whatever direction they choose to go in, it is worth bearing in mind that their most convincing World Cup final came from creating solutions on the fly to allow one player to go on a tear. Sometimes in international football, what you need will only become clear when it happens.

1. Theivam, K and J. Kassouf (2019) The Making of the Women’s World Cup: Defining stories from a sport’s coming of age

2. Murray, C (2019) The National Team: The Inside Story of the Women who Changed Soccer

3. Murray, C (2019) ibid.

4. Theivam, K and J. Kassouf (2019) ibid.

5. This was the first tournament with 24 teams, so a number of third placed teams went through

6. Murray, C (2019) ibid.